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HR Differentiation Between Professional and Managerial Employees: Broadening and 
Integrating Theoretical Perspectives 
November 13, 2016 
Abstract 
Recent HR differentiation research has been concerned with HRM differences within job 
groups (such as between more and less talented managerial employees) and HRM differences 
between job groups of different strategic value (such as knowledge and manual workers).  Less 
attention has been paid to HR differentiation among strategically valuable job groups.  This 
paper reviews literature relevant to the question whether (and how) firms should differentiate 
their HRM systems between professional and managerial job groups.  Four broad theoretical 
perspectives are adopted, including firm-level economic (“macro”), psychological (“micro”), 
institutional, and technical-feasibility perspectives.  Psychological, institutional, and technical-
feasibility perspectives are argued to favor a two-pronged approach, whereby professional HRM 
systems are nested within firm-level managerial HRM systems (while being subject to influence 
by field-level institutions).  The economic (resource-based) perspective, by contrast, implies HR 
homogenization across the two job groups.  Integrating the four perspectives, the paper points to 
potential longer-term negative effects of trends toward HR homogenization on professional skill 
standards and dedication to higher-order professional goals. 
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HR differentiation research is concerned with differences in HRM practices and their 
effects across employees within the organization.  This includes the talent management literature, 
which studies HR differentiation within a given job group (such as between more and less 
talented managerial employees) (e.g., Collings, Scullion, & Vaiman, 2015).  And it includes 
literature concerned with HR differentiation across job groups, such as managerial and 
professional employees (Krausert, 2014), semi-professional and clerical employees (McClean & 
Collins, 2011), and knowledge and manual workers (Yan, Peng, & Francesco, 2011).  Literature 
on job-level HR differentiation has typically adopted a firm-level economic (“macro”) 
perspective.  For example, building on the resource-based view of the firm, it has examined 
differences in HRM effects on firm performance depending on the strategic value of the job 
(Becker & Huselid, 2006; Huselid & Becker, 2011; Lepak & Snell, 1999; 2002; McClean & 
Collins, 2011; Melián-González & Verano-Tacorante, 2004).  And it has studied how the 
strategic value of the job affects the adoption of HRM practices (Kinnie, Hutchinson, Purcell, 
Rayton, & Swart, 2005; Lepak & Snell, 2002).  Differences in HRM effects across job groups 
were also studied from a human-capital- and transaction-cost-theoretical perspective (Lepak & 
Snell, 1999, 2002; Williamson, 1981) and from an organizational-control-theoretical perspective 
(Krausert, 2014).  Psychological (“micro”) perspectives on job-level HR differentiation have 
been adopted to a lesser extent, for example examining differences in individual-level (attitudinal 
and behavioral) responses to HRM practices across job groups (Clinton & Guest, 2013; Kinnie et 
al., 2005; Yan et al., 2011).  The psychology-based literature on HR differentiation also includes 
research concerned with injustice perceptions among employees subject to lower levels of HRM 
investment (Marescaux, De Winne, & Sels, 2013). 
Professional employees are employees performing jobs requiring a high degree of 
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technical specialization (such as lawyers, accountants, engineers, and medical doctors).  They are 
distinguished from managerial employees in that their expertise is more defined and specialized, 
their education and qualification more standardized (taking place in professional qualification 
institutions), and in that their job requires a greater degree of autonomy (e.g., Barker, 2010; 
Freidson, 1986, 2001; Krausert, 2014).  Professional and managerial employees both perform 
jobs of high strategic value to the firm (Lepak & Snell, 2002).  A high strategic value of the job, 
however, was argued to warrant firm investments in the tailoring of HRM systems to the specific 
demands of the job (Becker & Huselid, 2006; Huselid & Becker, 2011).  Thus, the question 
needs to be asked whether the demands on HRM differ and whether, consequently, firms should 
differentiate systems of HRM practices across these two job groups—or whether both job groups 
should be subject to the same HRM systems (such as a high-involvement HR system or a high-
performance work system, which are commonly argued to have positive effects on firm 
performance in the strategic HRM literature) (e.g., Jackson, Schuler, & Jiang, 2014).   
The existing HR differentiation literature contains a limited amount of theory and 
evidence relevant to that question.  Krausert (2014) explored differences in HRM effects across 
the two job groups from a firm-level economic (control-theoretical) perspective, suggesting that 
the economic benefits of adopting high-involvement HR systems are likely to be greater if 
applied to managerial compared to professional jobs.  Lepak and Snell (1999) likewise adopted 
an economic (resource-based and human-capital-/transaction-cost-theoretical) perspective.  Their 
model linked two dimensions of the job (its strategic value and firm specificity) to the 
effectiveness of different HRM systems (high-involvement, productivity-oriented, and control-
oriented HR systems).  Their arguments are, in principle, applicable to the distinction between 
professional and managerial jobs, too.  However, Lepak and Snell’s (2002) empirical work 
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yielded that professional jobs do not consistently map onto the proposed categories, implying 
that other factors may be at play, besides the two economic dimensions covered by their model.  
While the HR differentiation literature includes psychological perspectives on HR differentiation 
between knowledge and manual workers, such perspectives have not been applied to HR 
differentiation among different groups of knowledge workers to date (Clinton & Guest, 2013; 
Kinnie et al., 2005; Yan et al., 2011).  Other perspectives than firm-level economic and 
psychological perspectives, such as institutional perspectives, have generally not found their way 
into the HR differentiation literature yet.   
This paper reviews a wider range of literature relevant to the question whether (and how) 
firms should differentiate their HRM systems between professional and managerial job groups.  
This includes a review of the existing HR differentiation literature in HRM as well as of 
sociological literature concerned with professionalism and managerialism.  The focus of the 
literature review is on theory as opposed to methodology.  The literature will be discussed from 
four broad theoretical perspectives, including the firm-level economic (“macro”) perspective, the 
psychological (“micro”) perspective, the institutional perspective, and the technical-feasibility 
perspective.  It will be argued that the four perspectives are systematically interrelated in that the 
institutional and technical-feasibility perspectives define social and technical constraints on firm-
level economic choices, respectively.  While the psychological perspective is argued to inform 
economic choices, specifying likely (attitudinal and behavioral) employee-level responses to 
HRM choices.   
Across the four perspectives, the literature review yields different answers to the question 
whether (and how) firms should differentiate HRM systems across professional and managerial 
employees.  Institutional and technical feasibility constraints as well as psychological factors are 
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argued to favor a two-pronged approach to HRM (whereby professional HRM systems are 
nested within firm-level managerial HRM systems while being subject to influence by field-level 
institutions).  By contrast, the firm-level economic perspective includes both theory implying HR 
differentiation (human capital / transaction cost theory) and theory implying HR homogenization 
across the two groups (the resource-based view of the firm).   
Building on the literature review, the paper then develops an argument to suggest that the 
institutional perspective may relate to the economic perspective not only in that it defines 
constraints on firm-level HRM choices.  Field-level professional institutions may potentially also 
serve to enable a higher standard of professional skills and dedication to higher-order 
professional goals, facilitating firm competitiveness in the longer term.  Thus, recent trends 
toward firm-level HR homogenization across professional and managerial job groups may 
perhaps enable a greater focus on strategic goals of the firm in the near term (from a resource-
based view).  However, from a functionalist institutional point of view, it might also entail a risk 
of lower standards of professional (technical) skill, reduced dedication to higher-order 
professional goals, and consequent negative effects on the international competitiveness of firms 
in the longer term.        
The integration of multiple theoretical perspectives in this paper is consistent with recent 
calls for a greater integration of macro and micro perspectives on HRM (Huselid & Becker, 
2011; Ployhart & Hale, 2014; Wright, Coff, & Moliterno, 2014).  It goes beyond such calls in 
that it suggests that economic and psychological perspectives will be more relevant if they are 
also integrated with institutional and technical-feasibility perspectives, introducing the context 
that affects economic choices and influences psychological responses in practice.  Finally, the 
scope of this paper shall be limited to HR differentiation between professional and managerial 
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employees in heteronomous professional organizations (such as automobile or chemical firms).  
The arguments are not applicable in the same way to questions of HR differentiation in 
professional organizations (such as law or auditing firms). 
2. Broadening theoretical perspectives 
The existing HR differentiation literature can be classified into two broad theoretical 
perspectives—economic (or “macro”) and psychological (or “micro”) perspectives.  Economic 
perspectives on HRM are concerned with relationships between systems (or bundles) of HRM 
practices and unit- or firm-level outcomes, such as firm performance or employee turnover, as 
well as factors in- and outside the organization that mediate and moderate these relationships.  
Psychological perspectives on HRM are concerned with individual (attitudinal and behavioral) 
responses to HRM practices, including effects on outcomes such as organizational commitment, 
job satisfaction, intention to quit, and individual performance (as well as mediating and 
moderating factors). 
2.1 Economic (“macro”) perspectives 
Within the broader category of (firm-level) economics-based research on HR 
differentiation, three more specific theoretical perspectives can be distinguished: the strategic 
value perspective (based on the resource-based view of the firm), the human-capital-/transaction-
cost-theoretical perspective, and the control-theoretical perspective.  First, the strategic value 
perspective suggests that HRM investments create a “bigger bang for the buck” if applied to 
strategic jobs, that is, jobs making a bigger difference for firm performance (Becker & Huselid, 
2006; Huselid & Becker, 2011; Lepak & Snell, 1999).  HRM investments are typically defined in 
terms of the extent to which high-involvement HR practices (or high-performance work 
practices) are adopted, from involving and team-based forms of work organization, through 
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selective staffing and investments in employee training and development, to employment 
security and incentives linked to organizational performance.  Research in this vein is 
theoretically based on the resource-based view of the firm.  That is, HRM is assumed to impact 
on firm performance via firm competencies (rather than just the cost-related factors dealt with by 
the theories discussed below).  There is some empirical support for the argument that 
performance returns on HRM investments correlate with the strategic value of the job (Lepak & 
Snell, 2002; Melián-González & Verano-Tacorante, 2004; McClean & Collins, 2011).  This does 
not necessarily imply that HRM investments should be targeted at jobs of strategic value only, 
however.  The literature also includes arguments suggesting that an extension of the resource-
based logic across the organization may entail positive synergistic effects at the firm (cross-
employee-group) level:  The continuous honing of a homogenous HRM system to support 
strategic competencies across all functions of the organization may arguably facilitate the 
development of a shared frame of reference, knowledge exchange among functions (such as 
production and marketing), innovation, flexibility, and a greater focus on the strategic goals of 
the firm throughout the organization (where this focus may make a smaller but positive 
difference in some job groups and a larger difference in others) (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009; 
Garaus et al., 2016; Lado & Wilson, 1994).  
Second, human-capital- and transaction-cost-theoretical perspectives are concerned with 
choices between “making” and “buying” human capital, that is, whether firms tend to recruit 
employees with needed skills from the labor market or whether they tend to invest more in firm-
internal skills development.  The argument is essentially a cost efficiency argument:  HRM 
systems more geared toward external recruitment are arguably more efficient given generic skill 
requirements of the job.  HRM systems more geared toward internal skills development are 
8 
 
arguably more efficient to the extent jobs require firm-specific skills.  Human capital theory 
suggests that investments in internal skills development—given skill requirements are generic—
may be affected by a free-rider problem (other firms may poach trained employees) and a hold-
up problem (trained employees are in a position to negotiate at least the going market rate for 
their skills).  Thus, firms investing in the internal development of generic skills will arguably 
incur the same wage costs as firms recruiting the skills from the labor market, plus costs 
associated with the development of the skills (Becker, 1964; see Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 
2012, for a critical discussion).  According to transaction cost theory, jobs demanding firm-
specific skills are associated with higher transaction costs given employee turnover (in terms of 
recruitment, selection, socialization, training and development, and time required until new 
employees perform at their regular level of productivity).  Thus, firms have greater incentives to 
invest in retention-enhancing HRM practices (such as internal staffing, internal mobility, 
deferred pay, job embeddedness, and procedural justice) given skills are firm specific 
(Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011; Williamson, 1981).  On that basis, it has been argued that jobs with 
more firm-specific skill requirements are matched best by a high-involvement HR system 
(supporting internal skills development and retention) while jobs with more generic skill 
requirements are matched by a productivity-oriented HR system (which is more focused on 
recruitment and selection and eliciting productivity from employees already possessing 
necessary skills) (Lepak & Snell, 1999, 2002).  More recently, this perspective was, in essence, 
also adopted by Swart and Kinnie (2013) (building on Kang and Snell, 2009, who expanded the 
distinction between generic and firm-specific skills into two types of intellectual capital 
configuration).   
A third, less frequently adopted perspective is organizational control theory.  This 
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perspective is concerned with choices among three approaches to employee coordination 
(“control”)—behavior (or process) control, output control, and clan (or input) control (Ouchi, 
1977, 1979; Snell, 1992).  The choice is argued to hinge on costs of administrative information, 
which, in turn, depend on the uncertainty and complexity of the task.  Given low levels of task 
complexity, the work process can be structured—behavior/process control can be adopted 
relatively easily.  Given low levels of task uncertainty, it is feasible to define, and evaluate the 
achievement of, crystallized output goals—output control can be adopted relatively easily.  
Given high task uncertainty and high task complexity, neither behavior/process nor output 
control is feasible.  What is always feasible is input/clan control—not a form of top-down control 
but informal coordination among skilled and motivated employees.  On that basis, Krausert 
(2014) categorized jobs of top managers, middle managers, and professional employees 
according to their task uncertainty and complexity to match them with different modes of 
coordination (where input/clan control was associated with a high-involvement HR system, 
output control with a productivity-oriented HR system, and behavior/process control with a 
control-oriented HR system, encompassing narrow job definitions, close monitoring, and 
compensation based on hourly wages).   
2.2 Psychological (“micro”) perspectives 
Several papers within the psychology-based literature on HR differentiation have been 
adopting an organizational justice perspective (e.g., Björkman et al., 2013; Malik & Singh, 2014; 
Marescaux et al., 2013).  Similar to the strategic value perspective in the economics-based 
literature, HR differentiation is defined in quantitative terms:  The concern is with differences in 
the extent of adoption of a single, broad range of HRM practices (such as high-involvement HR 
or high-performance work practices)—as opposed to the adoption of “qualitatively” different 
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HRM systems across employee groups.  The results of this research generally support that HR 
differentiation has negative effects on the attitudes of employee groups subject to lower levels of 
HRM investment (e.g., on organizational commitment) (Marescaux et al., 2013).  Apart from the 
organizational justice perspective, research has also examined (direct) effects of HR 
differentiation on organizational commitment, intention to quit, and employee wellbeing (Clinton 
& Guest, 2013; Kinnie et al., 2005). 
It can be argued that there is scope for the adoption of a wider range of psychology-based 
perspectives in the HR differentiation literature.  For example, a psychology-based perspective 
that has been commonly adopted in the strategic HRM literature is social exchange theory.  
According to that, employees perceive certain HRM practices (such as socialization practices, 
investments in training and development, career opportunities in the organization, and generous 
pay and benefits) to be discretionary (in other words, employers are perceived to provide benefits 
beyond what they would have to provide in a purely market-based exchange).  And this leads the 
employees to reciprocate by displaying discretionary attitudes and behaviors on their part (such 
as organizational commitment, effort, and extra-role behavior) (e.g., Blau, 1964; Kehoe & 
Wright, 2013).  While commonly adopted in the strategic HRM literature, this perspective has 
barely been used in the HR differentiation literature.  McClean and Collins (2011) made some 
references to social exchange theory, arguing that it explains HRM effects on individual 
performance.  However, when it came to explaining their finding of differential HRM effects on 
company performance across job groups, they resorted to the strategic value perspective.  
Similarly, Ang, Bartram, McNeil, Leggat, and Stanton (2013) made (more extensive) references 
to social exchange theory, however, did not develop much of a theoretical argument as to why 
social exchange theoretical effects should differ across job groups either.  Future research could, 
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for instance, examine differences in value attributed by employees to HRM practices across job 
groups (such as due to differences in employment opportunities in the external labor market) and 
whether this leads to differences in the extent to which different employee groups reciprocate by 
displaying discretionary attitudes and behavior.   
2.3 Technical-feasibility perspectives 
The human-capital-/transaction-cost-theoretical perspective encompasses, as presented in 
the strategic HRM literature, two different arguments (which are sometimes confounded).  One 
argument relates to generic, transferable skills, which can be either developed internally or 
recruited from the external labor market.  The argument in relation to such skills is that they are 
more cost efficiently recruited from the external labor market than developed internally (Becker, 
1964; Campbell et al., 2012).  The other argument is that firm-specific skills—which, by 
definition, necessarily have to be developed internally—require greater investments to be 
developed, entailing that costs of turnover are higher and, consequently, that it pays for the firm 
to protect respective investments by embedding employees with firm-specific skills in the 
organization (Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011; Williamson, 1981).  Generic and firm-specific skill 
requirements should not be viewed as ends on a continuum:  The extent to which a job requires 
firm-specific skills is independent from the extent to which it requires generic skills (firm-
specific and generic skill requirements may, potentially, be both high or both low) (Campbell et 
al., 2012).   
It may then be argued that, to the extent a job requires generic skills, firms may make 
economic choices (based on cost efficiency considerations) about either recruiting these skills 
from the external labor market or developing them internally.  By contrast, to the extent a job 
requires firm-specific skills, external recruitment is not a feasible option.  Firms must adopt the 
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internal development approach for reasons of technical feasibility (rather than cost efficiency).  
This distinction between feasibility and cost efficiency reasoning should be especially relevant 
when it comes to the HR differentiation debate:  If some job categories of the organization 
require high levels of firm-specific skills while other job categories do not, the firm must 
necessarily adopt an HRM system supporting internal skill development for the former job 
categories.  If the firm wanted to adopt a homogenous HRM system for the entire organization, 
theoretically, it would not have any options but to extend the HRM system geared toward 
internal skill development to all employees.  Alternatively, the HRM system would need to be 
differentiated within the organization. 
A similar argument may be made in relation to the earlier presented control-theoretical 
perspective on HR differentiation.  Given high levels of task complexity, the argument is that 
firms should adopt output and/or clan modes of coordination—essentially because behavior 
(process) control is not feasible:  High levels of task complexity imply that managers do not have 
a sufficiently detailed knowledge of cause-effect relations to design and monitor a highly 
structured work process.  By contrast, given high levels of task uncertainty, the argument is that 
firms should adopt behavior and/or clan modes of coordination—essentially because it is not 
clear ex ante what kind of results will need to be delivered (output control is not feasible).  Clan 
control is always feasible—and the only feasible option to the extent both task complexity and 
task uncertainty are high:  Regardless of the availability of administrative information, firms can 
always ensure that employees are recruited, selected, trained, and developed to meet high 
standards of skill, that they are socialized and rewarded to ensure that they understand, and are 
committed to, organizational goals, and that (involving) work designs allow skilled and 
motivated employees to make a difference to the performance of the organization.   
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Again, these arguments are particularly relevant in the context of the HR differentiation 
debate.  If an organization includes some job categories characterized by high levels of task 
complexity, the firm’s choices with regard to modes of employee coordination should be more 
skewed toward output and clan control for these job categories.  If the organization 
simultaneously employs job categories characterized by high levels of task uncertainty, the 
feasible choices should be more skewed toward behavior and clan control for those categories.  
This does not rule out a homogenous HRM system for the entire organization.  However, if the 
HRM system is to be homogenous, the implication is that it would have to be an HRM system 
encompassing substantial elements of clan control. 
2.4 Institutional perspectives 
Apart from technical-feasibility constraints, firm-level choices of HRM systems may also 
be constrained by institutions, constituting “non-technological constraints on human 
interactions” (Greif, 1994, p. 943).  Institutions can be defined as sets of formal rules (e.g., labor 
laws, collective agreements), informal rules or norms (e.g., industry standards), and cognitions 
(established ways of thinking) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995).  An example is the 
German apprenticeship system, which prescribes precareer vocational qualification practices via 
laws, informal pressures from various stakeholder groups (such as works councils, chambers of 
commerce, and the media), and expectations (cognitions) about appropriate practices for 
precareer vocational qualification (e.g., Finegold & Wagner, 2002).  Companies comply with 
institutions to gain legitimacy, securing the good will of stakeholders they depend on, including 
employers and industry associations, professional associations, the media, customers, investors, 
financial institutions, employees, job applicants, trade unions, works councils, suppliers, and 
government agencies.  Due to institutions, firms become more similar to one another—both as a 
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result of deliberate compliance with norms and rules and as a result of inadvertent participation 
in the currents and trends of the industry (Oliver, 1991).  Institutional theory distinguishes three 
causes of convergence (isomorphism) among firms: coercive isomorphism (resulting from laws 
and political influence), normative isomorphism (resulting from influence of professional 
associations, education, and qualification institutions), and mimetic isomorphism (imitation 
among competitors given uncertainty about the effectiveness of different practices) (Scott, 1995).   
The institutional literature has also identified institutions and isomorphism in relation to 
HRM practices such as assessment centers (Delmestri & Walgenbach, 2009) and performance 
management systems (Decramer, Smolders, Vanderstraeten, & Christiaens, 2012).  In the HRM 
(as opposed to institutional) literature, the institutional lens has been predominantly adopted to 
study international differences in HRM practices.  In strategic HRM, it has scarcely played a role 
to date.  Exceptions include Deephouse (1999) and Paauwe (2004), arguing that sustainable 
competitive advantage cannot be accomplished by solely focusing on economic goals while 
neglecting legitimacy concerns altogether.  Firms must achieve a balance, they argued, between 
the optimization of their HRM practices in relation to economic goals (setting themselves apart 
from the competition) and maintaining legitimacy by conforming to professional and industry 
standards and societal expectations.   
The institutional perspective should be particularly relevant for the study of HR 
differentiation.  Institutions may be regarded as constraints on HRM practice choices (Greif, 
1994).  If institutions relating to HRM practices vary across job categories, this may be a factor 
necessitating HR differentiation.  At the very least, institutional differences across job categories 
need to be understood and carefully managed, also and especially if the goal was to adopt a 
homogenous HRM system.  Norms and collective beliefs about appropriate HRM practices were 
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found to vary across job groups within the organization (Kehoe & Wright, 2013; Nishii & 
Wright, 2008). Differences in institutional influences across job groups stem from factors beyond 
the firm, such as professional organization:  Sherer and Lee (2002) studied corporate law firms 
making changes to a long-established HRM system for lawyers during the 1980s.  Their study 
shed light on the influence on HRM practices of various actors in the law profession, revealing a 
laborious process of lobbying and negotiation before established HRM practices could be altered 
legitimately.  Wallace (1995) described how institutionalized HRM systems for lawyers are 
adopted and protected not only in corporate law firms but also in heteronomous professional 
firms, coexisting with (and shielded from) the bureaucratic systems applied to other employee 
groups in such firms.   
Although institutional theory has played only a limited role in the strategic HRM 
literature to date, the strategic HRM literature was predated by another, institutionally based 
literature—the employment systems literature—which has been concerned with institutionalized 
HRM systems for different employee groups (e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Hendry, 2003; 
Osterman, 1987).  The employment systems literature was more descriptive than the strategic 
HRM literature, depicting existing institutionalized employment systems and historical events 
that led to their institutionalization.  It did also describe economic rationales for each HRM 
system, which, however, were not assumed to be subject to decision making at the firm level.  
New employment systems were argued to emerge during periods of major technological, 
economic, and societal change.  During such periods, firms arguably experiment with alternative 
solutions to newly emerging technical and economic demands—until a fitting, more widely 
adopted system emerges, which subsequently becomes institutionalized.  It was argued that 
newly emerged employment systems do not entirely replace previously institutionalized systems, 
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but that they coexist in different segments of the workforce (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Hendry, 
2000; Lawrence, 1985).  The relatively more recent publications in the employment systems 
literature distinguished five institutionalized employment systems: the professional/craft system, 
the unstructured market system, the industrial system, the career or internal labor market system, 
and the high-involvement HR system (or high-performance work system) as the most recently 
emerged paradigm (e.g., Hendry, 2003; Krausert, 2009; Lawrence, 1985; Osterman, 1987). 
3. Integrating Perspectives on HR differentiation between professional and managerial 
employees  
In this section, it shall be argued that HR differentiation research would benefit from a 
greater integration of multiple theoretical perspectives, including the four broad perspectives 
distinguished in the previous section.  The argument is consistent with recent calls for a greater 
integration of macro and micro research in HRM (e.g., Ployhart & Hale, 2014; Wright, Coff, & 
Moliterno, 2014).  It extends beyond such calls in that the argument does not only concern the 
integration of economic and psychological perspectives but also the integration of institutional 
and technical-feasibility perspectives.  Firm-level economic choices of HRM practices are likely 
to be more effective if they are based on an understanding of the technical and institutional 
context, as much as they should benefit from the integration of insights of the psychology-based 
literature. 
The section illustrates how the four perspectives may be integrated by applying them 
more specifically in the context of HR differentiation between professional and managerial 
employees.  A comprehensive sociological literature on professionalism has been suggesting the 
organization and management of professionals is subject to influences from field-level 
institutions.  This literature often contrasts professional employees with managerial employees as 
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well as professionalism and managerialism as two alternative approaches to organization 
(Freidson, 1986; Wallace, 1995).  At the same time, traditional professional practice (such as of 
law, accounting, medicine, and architecture) has been increasingly performed within the 
boundaries of large organizations (Muzio, Brock, & Suddaby, 2013; Wallace & Kay, 2008).  
New so-called organizational professions have emerged, including HRM, health and safety, and 
project management (Daudigeos, 2013; Muzio et al., 2013).  Professional employees 
increasingly work alongside managerial (and other) employee groups in large organizations, 
while it was found that their approaches to organization continue to differ (Swart & Kinnie, 
2013; Wallace, 1995).  Both employee groups perform jobs of strategic value (Krausert, 2014; 
Lepak & Snell, 2002).  Thus, according to the strategic value perspective, it should not be the 
question whether (or to what extent) firms invest in the two employee groups, but how to invest 
in, potentially, qualitatively differentiated HRM systems.  HR differentiation between 
professional and managerial employees should provide a fertile and relevant ground to illustrate 
how the four broad perspectives might be applied. 
This section will begin by explaining the distinction between professional and managerial 
employees.  It will then, firstly, discuss technical-feasibility perspectives.  Technical feasibility 
constraints on HRM practice choices are, by definition, immovable and, thus, define the broadest 
conceivable range of feasible HRM practices.  Second, the section will discuss institutional 
perspectives.  Institutions constitute nontechnical constraints on human interactions.  Like 
technical feasibility, they define a space of feasible HRM practices.  However, different from 
technical feasibility constraints, they do not constitute constraints that are entirely immovable.  
The rules, norms, and cognitions that constitute institutions are being evaded and violated at 
times, exceptions are being made, and they evolve and change over time (Oliver, 1991; Sherer & 
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Lee, 2002).  Third, the subsection on psychological perspectives will discuss potential 
differences in employee responses to various HRM interventions across the two employee 
groups, conditioned by differences in technical-feasibility and institutional factors.  Finally, the 
subsection on economic perspectives will examine economic choices in relation to HRM 
practices for the two employee groups, taking into account technical and institutional constraints 
as well as differences in attitudinal and behavioral responses across the two groups. 
3.1 Distinguishing professional from managerial employees  
Borrowed from sociology, the distinction between professional and managerial 
employees has recently also been adopted in the HRM and management literatures (Barker, 
2010; Krausert, 2014).  Both occupational groups perform highly skilled, complex jobs.  
However, they differ in the degree to which education, qualification, and skill requirements are 
standardized across firms, in the extent to which knowledge and skills are broad and generalist as 
opposed to in-depth and technically specialized, and in the career trajectories that are more likely 
to extend across organizations (in the case of professional employees) and more likely to proceed 
within the organization (in the case of managerial employees).   
The sociological literature on professions is divided into two perspectives.  First, 
according to the functionalist perspective, professions serve to ensure that functions important to 
society (such as law, accounting, engineering, or medicine) are performed to a high standard of 
quality (Freidson, 1986; Muzio et al., 2013).  According to this perspective, characteristics of 
professions include the existence of a defined body of professional knowledge and skills, 
extensive precareer qualification, certification or licensing requirements, the regulation of 
professional qualification and certification/licensing by a professional association, autonomy of 
professionals in the application of professional knowledge and skills, and control over 
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professional work via professional values and peer monitoring as opposed to bureaucratic 
systems of control (Muzio et al., 2013; Saporta & Farjoun, 2003; Wallace & Kay, 2008).  By 
contrast, second, the conflict-based perspective on professions is concerned with collective 
organization among professional employees.  According to that perspective, professions serve to 
give their members control over the professional labor supply (via control over qualification and 
certification/licensing procedures) and, ultimately, power over consumers of professional 
services and other occupational groups in the struggle for resources (Freidson, 2001; Kleiner & 
Krueger, 2010).  This includes struggles within organizations in which professions seek “control 
over specific spaces, tasks, and processes within their employing organizations” (Muzio et al., 
2013, p. 710).    
The literature on professions often distinguishes professional employees from managerial 
employees (or administrators) (Barker, 2010; Saporta & Farjoun, 2003).  The function of 
managerial employees is to allocate resources so as to support the goals of the organization and 
its governing board (Freidson, 1986; Krausert, 2009).  Their expertise is less defined, allowing 
for various educational backgrounds and qualifications.  Their expertise also tends to be broader, 
more generalist, and more firm specific:  To perform their roles, they need to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of the specific products, services, structures, processes, routines, 
culture, networks, and politics of an organization (Krausert, 2014).  Given the greater firm 
specificity of their expertise, their career opportunities are more likely to be within an 
organization (Kinnie et al., 2005; Saporta & Farjoun, 2003). Managers are regarded 
“organizational guardians” and “prototypical organization members” (Hekman, Steensma, 
Bigley, & Hereford, 2009, p. 1326).  They represent organizational goals vis-à-vis professional 
employees, such as efficiency and profitability, whereas professional employees, ideal-typically, 
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are more concerned with the higher-order goals associated with their professionalism, such as 
health, justice, or truth (Freidson, 2001).  Goals of professions and organizations (as well as 
goals of professionals and managers) were argued to be, at least partially, in conflict (Aranya & 
Ferris, 1984; Carrington, Johansson, Johed, & Őhman, 2013; Hekman et al., 2009).   
The distinction between managerial and professional employees is not always clear cut.  
Gouldner (1957, 1958) distinguished between local and cosmopolitan role orientations, where 
professionals are more embedded in their specific organization given a local role orientation 
while the focus of their identification is more on the profession (beyond specific employing 
organizations) given a cosmopolitan orientation.  Another type of professional at the intersection 
of professionalism and managerialism is the principal (or boundary-spanning professional)—a 
senior professional who represents professional interests vis-à-vis the employing organization 
(Freidson, 1986; Kohli & Kettinger, 2004).  The principal is still a professional and considered 
primus inter pares, that is, speaking on behalf of professional interests in a flat professional 
hierarchy.  This contrasts with the former professional who has become a manager.  This person 
is no longer treated as a member of the profession and may even be seen to have betrayed 
professional ideals by changing sides and by developing the type of generalist skills that enable 
control over resources rather than the pursuit of higher-order professional goals (Hekman et al., 
2009; Larson, 1977).  Finally, it is being debated to what extent professional employees in large 
organizations have become subject to the same pressures and management approaches as other 
employee groups.  In professional organizations (law firms), it was found that the traditional 
ideals of professionalism are most likely to apply to partners and solo practitioners and, to a 
lesser degree, to associates (employed lawyers) (Wallace & Kay, 2008).  In heteronomous 
professional organizations, it was found that (law) professionals manage to separate their 
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department organizationally from the rest of the organization, enabling them to adhere to 
professional principles while adapting them, to some extent, to the (bureaucratic) organizing 
principles of the employing organization (Wallace, 1995). 
3.2 Technical-feasibility perspectives 
The standardization of education, qualification, and knowledge and skills across firms is 
a central defining characteristic of professionalism, enabling certification or licensing at the 
occupational level (securing high standards of professional service quality, from a functionalist 
perspective) as well as collective organization (enabling professional control over the 
professional skill supply, from a conflict-based perspective) (Freidson, 2001; Muzio et al., 2013).  
It might potentially be argued that this standardization is, in some professions, the result of social 
conventions and collective action, rather than the result of technical constraints:  The enactment, 
enforcement of, and compliance with laws (or accounting rules) might be argued to be the result 
of social action—and, thus, a phenomenon in the realm of institutions—while it would be less 
debatable to refer to the “laws” of engineering as technical constraints.  Nevertheless, from an 
HRM perspective, it will hopefully be acceptable to treat the standardization and general 
applicability of laws and accounting rules (as well as laws of engineering) as a given.  In other 
words, it shall be assumed that firms are not in a position to develop their own, firm-specific 
approach to law or accounting and that knowledge and skill requirements are generic (defined by 
the technicalities of law, accounting, or engineering).  This does not preclude that professional 
employees must also develop some firm-specific knowledge, such as of products, services, and 
social connections in a firm.  Despite that, the assumption that firm-specific skills are relatively 
less critical for professional jobs is common in the literature (e.g., Barker, 2010; Krausert, 2014).  
This contrasts with managerial jobs, which require knowledge and skills having to do less 
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with the technicalities of one particular function and more with the integration of different 
functions in the structures, processes, and routines of the firm, so as to facilitate a viable and 
differentiated business strategy (Drucker, 1977; Freidson, 2001; Krausert, 2009).  These 
structures, processes, and routines differ from firm to firm, driven by the (unique) value 
propositions made by firms in their product markets (Boudreau & Lawler, 2014; Jackson et al., 
2014).  They also differ because they are path dependent and, thus, contingent on the unique 
histories of firms (Barney & Wright, 1998; Wright, McMahan, & McWilliams, 1994).  Thus, the 
function of managers can be defined as obtaining, allocating, and utilizing resources so as to 
balance the interests of the stakeholders of the firm—against the backdrop of its unique market 
and historical context (see also Freidson, 2001).  To be able to perform their roles, managers 
need to undergo an extensive firm-specific development process, learning about the products, 
services, structures, processes, routines, culture, and social landscape across different parts of 
their organization (Conner, 2000; Drucker, 1977; Karaevli, 2007).  Career trajectories across 
firms have become more common among managerial employees, too (typical targets for external 
staffing of managerial positions range from 10 to 20 percent in large corporations today, while 
they used to range from 5 to 10 percent 20 years ago).  At the same time, research has yielded 
that external staffing of management positions is associated with relatively high failure rates 
(Hamori & Kakarika, 2009).  All in all, knowledge and skill requirements can be seen to be, in 
general, more firm specific for managerial compared to professional jobs (Barker, 2010; 
Krausert, 2014). 
Interpreting human capital theory from a technical-feasibility perspective, it may then be 
argued that the space of feasible options should be more constrained for managerial than 
professional jobs as far as choices between “making” and “buying” needed human capital are 
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concerned.  While firms may staff a certain percentage of managerial positions externally, an 
HRM strategy relying predominantly on external sourcing of managerial talent, with substantial 
levels of employee turnover, would be less feasible.  By contrast, from a technical feasibility 
standpoint alone, one might argue that, for professional job categories, both a strategy relying to 
a larger extent on external sourcing and a strategy focused more on internal development would 
be feasible.  
Technical feasibility constraints were earlier also associated with task complexity and 
task uncertainty.  Besides choices between making and buying human capital, it was argued that 
choices among different modes of employee coordination (behavior, output, and clan control) 
represent a second pivot around which the design of HRM systems revolves (Krausert, 2014).  
Descriptions in the literature of coordination systems for professional employees correspond to 
the notion of clan control—where the clan of professional employees is seen to be the profession 
rather than employing organization (Kohli & Kettinger, 2004; Leicht & Fennel, 2001).  They 
develop their professional identity, values, and behavioral norms at the outset of their career 
(besides their professional knowledge and skills) via professional qualification institutions 
(Freidson, 1986, 2001).  The ensuing commitment to their profession (to the “professional clan”) 
has been argued to last for a lifetime, while employing organizations are changed relatively 
frequently.  Commitment to the employing organization is arguably more temporary and less 
deep than commitment to the profession (Aranya & Ferris, 1984; Leicht & Fennel, 2001).  
Where professional employees are employed in heteronomous professional organizations, 
professional clans were found to be nested within the bureaucracy (or firm-level clan) of the 
employing organization (Wallace, 1995).  According to the functionalist perspective on 
professionalism, this should enable professional employees to exercise professional judgment 
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and authority as well as dedication to higher-order professional goals—to some extent shielded 
from the influence of (e.g., commercial) goals of the employing organization, networks of 
interest and influence among its various constituent groups, and processes and routines driven by 
issues of control over resources (Gunz & Gunz, 2007; Wallace, 1995; Wallace & Kay, 2008). 
Besides clan control, research has also revealed practices consistent with the notion of 
output control, that is, assessments and rewards of professionals based on performance results 
such as billable hours of lawyers (Wallace & Kay, 2008) and commission pay of financial 
advisors (Jorgenson & Becker, 2015).  Increasing commercial pressures on professionals are 
regularly discussed as threats to professional autonomy (e.g., Carrington et al., 2013).  Especially 
where targets are imposed on professionals by nonprofessional managers, they were found to 
meet the resistance of professionals.  By contrast, if introduced from within the profession (and, 
thus, accepted by professionals), the available research suggests that a degree of output control 
may be technically feasible (Kohli & Kettinger, 2004).  Feasibility of output control (besides 
clan control) is also consistent with research finding that professional employees are subject to 
either productivity-oriented HRM systems (revolving around output control) or high-
involvement HR systems (revolving around clan control) (Swart & Kinnie, 2013). 
In the literature on professionalism, practices associated with professional employees 
(and professionalism) are often contrasted with practices associated with managers (and 
“managerialism”).  Managerialism is associated with bureaucracy (e.g., Freidson, 2001; Wallace 
& Kay, 2008).  In control-theoretical terms, the notion of bureaucracy corresponds to behavior 
control, whereby work processes are made predictable and replicable through explicit 
prescription (and monitoring) of behavioral standards.  According to control theory, behavior 
control requires a low level of task complexity to be feasible (Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Snell, 1992).  
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Elsewhere, research studying the management function has been emphasizing the 
unpredictability and fluidity of managerial tasks—implying task uncertainty (Raes, Heijltjes, 
Glunk, & Roe, 2011; Wooldridge, Schmid, & Floyd, 2008).  To the extent management tasks are 
uncertain, output control should be less feasible.  Thus, in the triangle of feasible modes of 
coordination, managerial employees should be more biased toward behavior and clan control—in 
contrast to professional employees, who should be more biased toward clan and output control.  
That managerial employees are no longer just subject to bureaucracy as a form of control is 
consistent with the management literature, reporting extensive discretion of managers in relation 
to the tasks they attend to (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Tengblad, 2006).  Recent research has 
yielded that bureaucratic principles of organizing do still play a role, even though to a lesser 
extent than clan-based principles (Boudreau & Lawler, 2014). 
A final proposition from a technical-feasibility perspective relates to the locus of the clan 
either at the occupational or organizational level.  Traditionally, the professional employee’s clan 
has been argued to be the profession, extending beyond a single employing organization (Saporta 
& Farjoun, 2003; Wallace & Kay, 2008).  Professional values, norms, knowledge, and skills are 
arguably governed at the level of the profession (Daudigeos, 2013; Gunz & Gunz, 2007; Muzio 
et al., 2013).  At the same time, it was argued that professionals differ in the extent to which they 
identify with their profession versus employing organization, some becoming more embedded in 
the employing organization (“locals”) while others behave more consistently with the ideal-
typical professional model (“cosmopolitans”) (Gouldner, 1957, 1958).  Differences also exist 
across firms, where the professional department is more embedded in, and assimilated with, 
organization-level structures in some firms than others (Swart & Kinnie, 2013; Wallace, 1995).  
Finally, research found that professional employees may be simultaneously committed to both 
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their employing organization and their profession (Aranya & Ferris, 1984).  Overall, the research 
is consistent with the argument that, from a technical-feasibility perspective, professionals may 
identify with the “clan” at the organizational level, at the occupational level, or both.   
By contrast, with respect to managerial employees, it can be argued that employee 
coordination via a clan at the occupational rather than organizational level should not be feasible.  
Attempts at collective organization among managers have remained sporadic and unsuccessful 
(Snape & Bamber, 1989).  The educational backgrounds of managers remain manifold, despite 
the rise of the business school (Barker, 2010).  Top managers (as opposed to the broader class of 
middle managers) have been argued to be part of a social elite, which, however, encompasses not 
only top managers but also members of other occupations.  The purpose of such elite networks is 
arguably not to define and develop occupational values, standards, and skills but to protect the 
interests of its members (Freidson, 1986, 2001; McDonald & Westphal, 2011; Stern & Westphal, 
2010).  Thus, the space of feasible HRM practices should, again, be more limited for managers 
compared to professional employees:  Governance of skills and behavioral standards through an 
occupational-level clan can be argued to be an option in the case of professional but not 
managerial employees.  Coordination via organizational level clans should be technically 
feasible for both groups (see Table 1). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3.3 Institutional perspectives 
Professions have been argued to be governed by field-level institutions—formal rules 
specifying qualification, certification, and licensing requirements, codes of ethics, as well as 
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norms and cognitions in relation to a range of professional practices, including practices in the 
realm of HRM (Muzio et al., 2013; Saporta & Farjoun, 2003).  These field-level institutions have 
been argued to ensure the consistent provision of services that are critical for the effective 
functioning of society (from a functionalist point of view) (e.g., Gunz & Gunz, 2007; Wallace & 
Kay, 2008).  And they have been argued to serve the goal of occupational closure, enabling the 
profession to control access to the professional labor market (from a conflict-based perspective) 
(Kohli & Kettinger, 2004; Muzio et al., 2013).  Professional institutions arguably emerged from 
historical conflicts among occupational groups, representing settlements of these conflicts 
(which reflect the relative powers of the occupational groups) (Hendry, 2003; Kohli & Kettinger, 
2004; Muzio et al., 2013; Schotter, 1981).  While professional institutions may, at some point in 
time, have been the result of purposive action (to ensure quality of services and/or to settle 
conflicts of interest), once established, they can work at either a conscious or, often, a 
subconscious level:  Individual actors often follow the prevailing institutional logic in a habitual 
manner rather than as a result of rational choice (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Lawrence, 1985; 
March, 1994; Oliver, 1991). 
Thus, if professional, field-level institutions extend to HRM practices for professional 
employees, they may constitute a constraint on HRM practice choices at the firm level.  This 
constraint should be less immovable than technical feasibility constraints:  Oliver (1991) 
proposed a range of potential responses of firms in relation to institutions, including 
acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation.  On the other hand, there is 
evidence to suggest that the compliance of a firm with professional institutions relates positively 
to the organizational commitment of, and negatively to fluctuation among, its professional 
employees (Aranya & Ferris, 1984; Jorgenson & Becker, 2015).  Noncompliance by an 
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organization with professional institutions was found to invoke resistance among professional 
employees, which may render efforts to introduce nonprofessional (illegitimate) HRM practices 
futile (Hendry, 2003; Kohli & Kettinger, 2004; Wallace, 1995).  The strength of professional 
institutions varies between professions that are considered strong professions (such as law) and 
professions considered to be weak (such as engineering) (Freidson, 2001).  It is conceivable that 
the degree to which professional institutions constrain firm-level HRM choices varies 
correspondingly. 
So what types of HRM practices are considered to be legitimate by professional 
employees?  The literature regularly mentions four HRM practice areas that are distinct for 
professionals, relating to (1) professional qualification and development, (2) selection, 
assessment, and rewards, (3) task autonomy, and (4) inter-firm mobility.  First, knowledge and 
skills required to perform professional work are, to a large extent, acquired at the outset of the 
professional career, via professional qualification institutions (e.g., Swart & Kinnie, 2013).  
Professional qualification institutions encompass, besides universities and professional schools 
(such as law schools), also practical training elements conducted within the boundaries of a 
professional organization (such as a law firm).  In other words, these practical elements are 
subject to rules and norms governed at the field level (Freidson, 2001; Jorgenson & Becker, 
2015).  The argument also extends to continuing development activities (such as mentoring) 
taking place subsequent to the initial (precareer) qualification of the professional employee 
(Aranya & Ferris, 1984; Jorgenson & Becker, 2015).  Professional control over qualification and 
development practices implies that firm-level choices on training and development practices are 
relatively limited.  It also implies that the profession exercises control over how work is 
performed, given that the knowledge and skills of employees are a central influence on their 
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behavior at work (Jackson et al., 2014). 
Second, professional institutions demand professional autonomy when it comes to the 
selection, assessment, and rewarding of professional employees (Wallace, 1995).  The deep 
specialization of professional work arguably renders evaluation of professional knowledge, 
skills, and performance by managers infeasible and illegitimate.  Consequently, selection, 
assessment, promotion, and reward decisions need to be made within the network of professional 
employees, based on professional credentials, technical competence, and quantified performance 
outputs (Kohli & Kettinger, 2004; Swart & Kinnie, 2013; Wallace, 1995).  Recent research 
suggests that, besides the traditional technical competence and tangible output criteria, 
professional credentialing has become increasingly concerned with collegiality (Lindberg & 
Rantatalo, 2015).   
Third, professional institutions demand autonomy, too, when it comes to the performance 
of professional work.  Professionals are expected to have high levels of task autonomy.  
Professional hierarchies tend to be flat (based on technical expertise rather than seniority) 
(Wallace, 1995).  Coordination among professional employees is, traditionally, accomplished 
informally (through clan control) rather than formal goal setting or formal definition of work 
processes (Kohli & Kettinger, 2004).  In that context, professional identity and network ties 
among professionals in- and outside the organization are considered further elements of 
professional HRM systems (Hendry, 2003; Wallace, 1995).   
Finally, a fourth distinctive characteristic of professional HRM systems is relatively high 
levels of job mobility.  Career progress is more likely sought by changing employers, rather than 
vertical movement within the organization (Hendry, 2003; Krausert, 2014; Wallace, 1995).  
Vertical movement within the organization is associated with a move into an administrative 
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position, which is considered to be a move away from professional work and associated with a 
lower status in the professional value system (Saporta & Farjoun, 2003; Wallace, 1995).   
While the literature includes plenty of material on institutional influences on HRM 
practices for professional employees, there is less material on institutional influences on HRM 
practices for managers.  Given the absence of formal collective organization among managers, 
HRM practices are not as much constrained by formal rules (such as qualification and licensing 
requirements) (Barker, 2010).  However, theoretically, HRM practices might be subject to 
influence by informal institutions, that is, norms and cognitions about what would constitute 
acceptable practices.  The literature on professionalism often contrasts the professional with the 
bureaucratic system (which is associated with managers).  Bureaucracies are hierarchical, 
hierarchy is tied to the employee’s position and seniority, and tasks and roles are formally 
prescribed for every position in the hierarchy (Freidson, 2001; Wallace, 1995).  In the 
employment systems literature, the notion of bureaucracy corresponds to the career HRM system 
(or internal labor market system) (Hendry, 2003; Lawrence, 1985).  Apart from internal job 
ladders (that are linked to the organizational hierarchy), seniority-based progression, and narrow 
job definitions, this system has also been associated with firm-specific training and development 
and employment security.  Commonly applied to white-collar, semi-professional employees with 
a college education during the economic growth period following World War II, the career HRM 
system came under competitive pressure during the 1980s, at which point firms started to 
experiment with the high-involvement HR system (Hendry, 2003; Lawrence, 1985).  Since, firms 
have been adopting HRM practices spanning the range from career HRM to high-involvement 
HR systems (Boudreau & Lawler, 2014; Lawrence, 1985; Lepak et al., 2006; Swart & Kinnie, 
2013).  This suggests that institutional pressures to adopt one particular configuration of HRM 
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practices are likely to be weaker when it comes to managerial employees.  A broader range of 
HRM practices associated with career HRM and high-involvement HR systems appears to be 
legitimate.  
The main arguments of this subsection are summarized in Table 1 above.  HRM practices 
for professional employees are influenced by field-level institutions that are likely to be stronger 
compared to managerial employees.  At the same time, professional employees have increasingly 
been under pressure to become subject to greater managerial controls and, thus, to HRM 
practices resembling those that managerial employees are exposed to (Kohli & Kettinger, 2004; 
Wallace, 1995).  This raises some interesting questions, which might be addressed by future 
research.  For example, will greater exposure of professional employees to HRM practices 
devised at the firm level imply a weakening of field-level institutions?  If field-level institutions, 
from a functionalist perspective, serve to protect high professional standards, could HR 
homogenization at the firm level have the effect of lowering professional standards at the societal 
level in the longer term (while, potentially, serving to help individual firms to gain temporary 
financial and operational advantages in the near term)?  Could it affect the provision of 
disinterested professional advice (guided by higher-order professional goals), which used to be, 
to some extent, shielded from the employing organization’s bureaucracy (and the organizational 
objectives it is geared to)?  If activities of organizational members (such as managers) are to a 
greater extent coordinated through clan-like networks of social influence (rather than 
bureaucracy), can and should the provision of professional advice be shielded from networks of 
social influence that are geared toward organizational goals (as well as, arguably, opportunism 
among network members)?  Will professional employees need to spend more time on the 
development of the type of generalist skills associated with control over resources and could this 
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affect standards of professional skill in the longer term?  Or, alternatively, from a conflict-based 
perspective, might HR homogenization at the firm level result in the breaking down of 
occupational barriers established by occupational interest groups, primarily serving material 
interests of occupational members, while they do not actually serve the quality of professional 
service provision?  Could reduced professional power entail professional careers becoming less 
attractive, affecting the quality of the professional labor supply in the longer term?  More 
systematic research would be needed to address such questions, so as to ensure that current 
efforts of HR homogenization at the firm level are not simply the result of managerial employees 
wanting to “colonize” employee groups that have maintained a degree of autonomy to date (with 
a limited understanding of the system they are seeking to replace and of the wider implications of 
its replacement).   
3.4 Psychological perspectives 
A psychological perspective on HR differentiation between professional and managerial 
employees could examine differences in individual-level responses to HRM practices between 
the two employee groups.  A commonly adopted psychological perspective in the strategic HRM 
literature is social exchange theory.  According to this perspective, HRM practices such as the 
ones associated with high-involvement HR systems are perceived as discretionary benefits by 
employees, leading them to reciprocate by displaying positive attitudes and discretionary 
behaviors, for example organizational commitment and extra-role behaviors (Blau, 1964; Hom et 
al., 2009; Shaw, Dineen, Fang, & Vellela, 2009).   
This type of effect might then, potentially, vary between professional and managerial 
employees for the following reasons.  First, it is conceivable that professional employees attach 
less value to respective HRM practices than managerial employees and that reciprocating 
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behavior is, consequently, more limited, too (Belmi & Pfeffer, 2015).  HRM practices that are 
argued to trigger reciprocative behavior include training and development opportunities, career 
opportunities within the organization, employment security, work-life balance, and benefits.  
Incorporating the earlier theoretical perspectives, it might be argued that the careers of 
professionals are less dependent on training, development, and career opportunities provided at 
the discretion of an employing organization (Bridges & Villemez, 1991).  A relatively large part 
of the knowledge and skills they need is acquired at the outset of their career via professional 
institutions and, subsequently, developed continuously through the practice of professional work 
(Freidson, 2001).  By contrast, managerial employees depend more on the opportunities provided 
to them by their employer to become managers in the first place and to then progress in their 
career (Kinnie et al., 2005; Kotter, 1982).  Firm-internal career opportunities were found to be a 
significant predictor of organizational commitment for managerial but not professional 
employees (Kinnie et al., 2005).   
Apart from training, development, and career opportunities, it might be argued that 
professional employees are also likely to attribute less value to employment security than 
managerial employees:  The earlier described institutionalized HRM system for professional 
employees is geared toward facilitating mobility, enabling professional employees to take 
advantage of the demand for their services in the labor market (Freidson, 1986; Kleiner & 
Krueger, 2010; Pagliero, 2010).  Research has found that the average tenure of professional 
employees is shorter than that of managerial employees (Doogan, 2001).  Professional 
employees were found to attach less value to employment security compared to the opportunity 
to perform professionally interesting work (Barker, 2010; Mroczkowski & Pope, 1987).  And it 
was found that employment changes are associated with slower career progress for managers—
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which is consistent with the notion that managers should attach value not just to firm-internal 
career opportunities but also to employment security (Hamori & Kakarika, 2009).   
Second, apart from differences in the value attached to HRM practices, it is conceivable 
that perceived needs to reciprocate at a given level of perceived benefit—reciprocity norms—
differ between professional and managerial employees, too.  Reciprocity norms vary across 
individuals and settings.  For example, levels of reciprocal behavior were found to be lower if the 
recipient of benefits perceived instrumental motives of the donor (Belmi & Pfeffer, 2015; 
Gouldner, 1960), given injustice perceptions (Glomb & Liao, 2003), perceptions of income 
inequality (Gouldner, 1960; Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinski, 2012), and out-group membership of 
the donor (Masuda, 2012).  Kohli and Kettinger (2004) reported in-group perceptions among 
medical doctors in a hospital, distancing themselves from the hospital management as the out-
group.  More generally, it was argued that the professional’s primary target of identification (the 
in-group) tends to be the profession rather than the employing organization (Aranya & Ferris, 
1984; Leicht & Fennel, 2001).  Managers, by contrast, have been regarded prototypical 
organization members and, thus, are more likely to see themselves as part of the same in-group 
as those administering valued HRM practices (Hekman et al., 2009)—which should relate 
positively to the strength of reciprocity norms (Masuda, 2012).  Additionally, reciprocity norms 
of professional employees might, conceivably, be affected by income discrepancies between 
them and managers (Gouldner, 1960).  Moreover, there is some evidence of cynical attitudes 
among nonmanagerial employees toward their organizations’ HRM practices and the 
management rhetoric that comes with it (Beale & Mustchin, 2014).  This could indicate that 
these employees are attributing instrumental motives to their organization’s HRM practices, 
which may potentially affect reciprocity norms (Belmi & Pfeffer, 2015).  Hence, it is a 
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possibility (which needs to be further investigated by future research) that managers perceive 
HRM practices as discretionary benefits provided by in-group members (requiring reciprocation) 
while professional employees not only attach—relatively—less value to the HRM practices but 
also perceive less of an obligation to reciprocate.  The argument is consistent with research 
finding a weaker relationship between promotions (as an HR-related benefit) and quit ratios for 
professional employees compared to other employee groups (Saporta & Farjoun, 2003). 
3.5 Economic perspectives 
The arguments presented up to this point suggest that technical and institutional 
constraints as well as attitudinal and behavioral responses to HRM practices would favor a two-
pronged approach to HRM for managerial and professional employees in heteronomous 
professional organizations.  On the one hand, firm-specific skill requirements necessitate firm 
investments in training, development, and career paths for managerial employees (Becker, 1964).  
Given employee turnover is, as a result, associated with high transaction costs, investments in 
careful selection and retention-enhancing HRM practices (e.g., socialization, grievance 
procedures, and group-based pay) are likely to be associated with particularly high payoffs 
(Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011; Williamson, 1981).  Given high levels of task uncertainty (limiting 
the effectiveness of output control), employee coordination must rely on behavior control 
(bureaucracy) and/or (to the extent task complexity is high) clan control (investments in 
organizational commitment, knowledge, skills, and ability, and involving work designs) 
(Krausert, 2014; Ouchi, 1977, 1979).  Institutional pressures are likely to be relatively weak, 
where different versions of career HRM systems (bureaucracies), high-involvement HR systems 
(revolving around clan control), and high-performance work systems (combinations of elements 
of bureaucracy and clan control) all appear to be legitimate (Boudreau & Lawler, 2014; 
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Lawrence, 1985).  Firm investments in respective HRM practices are likely to elicit positive 
attitudinal and behavioral responses given employees are dependent on opportunities provided 
by their employers to become, and progress as, managers (Blau, 1964; Hamori & Kakarika, 
2009; Kinnie et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, when it comes to professional jobs, human capital theory would 
suggest that largely generic human capital requirements render external sourcing of needed skills 
more efficient (Becker, 1964).  Transaction cost theory would suggest relatively lower payoffs 
from investments in careful selection and retention-enhancing HRM practices given relatively 
low transaction costs associated with external recruitment of generic human capital (Hausknecht 
& Trevor, 2011; Williamson, 1981).  Control theory would suggest that, given lower task 
uncertainty, output control will be more feasible (compared to managerial jobs)—the range of 
feasible options for employee coordination should be more biased toward output and clan control 
(Ouchi, 1977, 1979).  The range of feasible options also includes clan control at the occupational 
level, in addition to organizational-level clan control.  The institutional perspective suggests that 
the path of least resistance would be the nesting of the occupational-level clan within the control 
system of the employing organization (bureaucracy and/or organizational-level clan), whereby 
the management of the organization would give professional employees autonomy to manage 
their function in line with professional institutions (Wallace, 1995).  Institutional influences have 
been argued to vary between what are considered strong professions (such as law or medicine) 
and weak professions (such as engineering or financial advising) (Freidson, 2001).  Managers of 
the employing organization should have more leeway to integrate professional employees into 
the organizational bureaucracy or clan given weaker forms of professionalism.  Finally, the 
psychological (social-exchange-theoretical) perspective—taking into account technical-
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feasibility and institutional context—has yielded, too, that professional employees are likely to 
respond most positively to HRM practices consistent with professional institutions while their 
integration in systems controlled at the organizational level may trigger resistance (Kohli & 
Kettinger, 2004).   
A two-pronged approach to HRM for professional and managerial employees may be 
seen to be conflicting with another economic perspective that has been influential in the strategic 
HRM literature since the 1990s—the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Barney & 
Wright, 1998).  The gist of it is that firms will arguably benefit from the continuous honing of a 
firm-specific HRM system, building on historically developed strengths and supporting their 
core competencies in unique ways (Barney & Wright, 1998; Lado & Wilson, 1994).  A unique 
(firm-specific) fit of a firm’s HRM system with other types of resources and its core 
competencies is argued to result in competitive advantage that is inimitable and, therefore, 
sustainable (Barney & Wright, 1998; Chadwick & Dabu, 2009).  Some argue that a resource-
based logic should be applied in particular to jobs of high strategic value (Becker & Huselid, 
2006).  However, it is also often suggested that firm performance will benefit if the resource-
based logic is extended across the entire organization, gearing all functions of the firm to the 
core competencies and strategic goals of the firm (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009).  The consistent 
application of a firm-specific HRM system across the organization has been argued to enable a 
shared frame of reference, consequently greater knowledge exchange across functional areas 
(such as R&D and marketing), continuous innovation, cross-functional flexibility, and 
responsiveness to market changes (Garaus et al., 2016).   
The degree to which professional functions are integrated in the organizational-level 
HRM system might conceivably vary across professional functions depending on how central 
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they are to the firm’s strategic differentiation (i.e., on their strategic value).  For example, R&D 
engineers might be more central to the unique market positioning of luxury car manufacturers 
than accountants, lawyers, and experts in information technology.  Consequently, such firms 
might invest more in the development of firm-internal competencies related to R&D engineering 
while relying to a greater degree on field-level institutions for the performance of accounting, 
legal, and information technology functions (see Matusik & Hill, 1998; Saxenian, 1990).  A 
greater organizational integration of the R&D engineering function in a luxury car manufacturing 
firm might also be facilitated by relatively weaker institutional pressures associated with the 
engineering profession compared to other, stronger professions (Freidson, 2001).  On the other 
hand, it was found that professional employees may become subsumed in organizational-level 
clans even if they are members of a strong profession and even if they are not central to the 
unique competitive positioning of their firm (Gunz & Gunz, 2007). 
By and large, the evidence suggests that pressures on professional functions to become 
incorporated in the HRM system of the employing organization have been growing (Muzio et al., 
2013; Wallace, 1995; Wallace & Kay, 2008).  Although perhaps logical from an (isolated) 
resource-based perspective, the integrated theoretical perspective of this paper points to potential 
costs of such trends toward firm-level HR homogenization.  Potential costs include transaction 
costs (given relatively high levels of professional employee turnover) and costs of overcoming 
professional resistance to integration (Jorgenson & Becker, 2015; Kohli & Kettinger, 2004; 
Wallace, 1995).  Positive social exchange theoretical effects of high-involvement HR systems 
may potentially be smaller for professional employees.   
Potential negative consequences of firm-level HR homogenization across professional 
and managerial job groups might also be derived from the functionalist institutional perspective 
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on professionalism.  Two kinds of effect are conceivable (and could be examined by future 
research).  First, it is conceivable that reduced adherence to professional training and 
qualification institutions in heteronomous professional organizations could result in reduced 
standards of professional skill in the longer term.  Investments in training and qualification tend 
to relate to firm-specific knowledge and skills if sponsored by the employing firm (Cutler, 1992; 
Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Grugulis & Vincent, 2009).  Professional institutions require 
investments in transferable skills—including during precareer qualification at universities, 
professional schools, and practical qualification elements at employing organizations and at later 
career stages (for example in terms of professional mentoring, ongoing professional qualification 
and training, certification, and opportunity to practice professionally relevant work) (e.g., 
Jorgenson & Becker, 2015).  Given that, from a functionalist institutional perspective, 
professional institutions have been argued to be a guarantor of consistent, high levels of 
professional skill, it needs to be asked if greater firm specificity and, consequently, less 
consistency of ongoing professional training and qualification activities could result in a 
lowering of professional standards across organizations.  From a human-capital-theoretical 
perspective, firms might not invest enough in skills that would be valuable but transferable 
(Becker, 1964; Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Grugulis & Vincent, 2009).  Apart from the 
distinction between generic and firm-specific skills, the literature suggests that, if left up to 
firms, investments in training and qualification generally tend to remain below levels that would 
be conducive to firm performance in the longer term due to near-term performance pressures 
(Krausert, forthcoming; Souder & Bromiley, 2012).  Thus, if training and qualification 
investments made at the firm level are generally too low and inconsistent across organizations, 
professionalism might be interpreted as a mechanism supportive of a higher and more consistent 
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level of human capital investment across firms in the US.  Future research should explore such 
arguments, including how effective professionalism has been in securing consistently high levels 
of professional skill across organizations.   
Second, besides the consistency and levels of professional knowledge and skill, firm-
level HR homogenization across professional and managerial job groups might also affect 
dedication to higher-order professional goals.  The functionalist institutional perspective suggests 
that the nesting of professional systems within the bureaucratic/clan systems of the employing 
organizations may also allow professional employees to not become fully immersed in 
structures, processes, routines, and politics that are geared toward organizational rather than 
higher-order professional goals (Wallace, 1995; Wallace & Kay, 2008).  Bureaucratic and clan 
systems of control geared toward (commercial) goals of employing organizations have been 
associated with the opportunistic pursuit of private outcomes by individual members of the 
organization, which has been argued to impede dedication to higher-order professional goals 
(e.g., Gunz & Gunz, 2007).  Thus, a degree of organizational separation between professional 
and managerial employees, manifested in HR differentiation, might potentially serve 
professional service quality also via dedication to professional goals, in addition to professional 
skill standards.  Future research could examine the relationship between HR differentiation and 
dedication to higher-order professional goals, effects of dedication to higher-order professional 
goals on professional service quality, whether they are moderated by the firm-level HRM system 
(e.g., bureaucracy versus clan) and by the extent of professional integration in the firm-level 
system, and whether effects and moderating effects differ across professions and firms (e.g., 




This paper has outlined research opportunities in relation to HR differentiation between 
professional and managerial jobs in heteronomous professional organizations.  Previous research 
examined differences in effects of high-involvement HR systems between these two job groups, 
adopting an economic (control-theoretical) perspective (Krausert, 2014).  At a more abstract 
level, the existing literature also encompasses theory and empirical evidence on economic effects 
of high-involvement, productivity-oriented, and control-oriented HR systems across broader job 
categories, adopting an integrated human-capital-/transaction-cost-theoretical and strategic value 
perspective (Lepak & Snell, 1999, 2002).  The current paper adds to such literature by exploring 
HR differentiation between professional and managerial jobs from four broad theoretical 
perspectives, including not only economic but also psychological, institutional, and technical-
feasibility perspectives.  Additionally, the paper has integrated a stream of literature on 
professionalism as well as various research studying the management function across those four 
perspectives.  The literature on professionalism has, to some extent, already been exploring HR-
related differences between professional and managerial employees (e.g., Freidson, 2001; 
Wallace, 1995).  However, it has generally been providing more detail on HRM practices for 
professional than for managerial employees.  And its theoretical perspective has been exclusively 
institutionalist.  An integration of literature across these four broad theoretical perspectives 
represents an expansion on recent calls for a greater integration of macro and micro perspectives 
on HRM (Ployhart & Hale, 2014; Wright et al., 2014).  The paper has illustrated how research 
would benefit from an integration of perspectives beyond just economic and psychological 
perspectives to also include perspectives that help define technical and social constraints on 
HRM, introducing the context that influences attitudinal and behavioral responses of employees 
as well as the firm-level economics of HRM in practice.  
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The paper should help advance the practical relevance of the HR differentiation literature.  
The arguments that were developed in relation to two specific and common job groups (see 
Table 1) should be both more easily testable and applicable in more immediate ways compared 
to previous approaches which have been characterizing job groups in more abstract terms.  A 
discussion of firm-level economic choices within the context of technical-feasibility and 
institutional influences should render the theory more realistic and, thus, practically relevant, 
compared to discussions of economic choices devoid of context.  The inclusion of the 
institutional perspective (as an otherwise less commonly adopted “bigger picture” perspective) 
has further drawn attention to potential consequences of HRM practice choices that have 
previously remained beyond the horizon of firm-level economic perspectives:  Integrating the 
functionalist institutional perspective with the resource-based view, it was argued that recent 
trends toward firm-level HR homogenization, while perhaps increasing financial and operational 
performance in the near term, may potentially be associated with longer term risks in terms of 
reduced levels of professional skill and reduced dedication to higher-order professional goals.  
This paper was specifically concerned with HR differentiation at the job-group level 
within the firm, that is, between regularly employed managerial and professional employees.  It 
was not concerned with HRM systems of professional contractors or with talent management 
programs that differentiate HRM practices between more and less talented employees in the 
same job group.  The arguments of the paper were developed in the context of heteronomous 
professional organizations.  They are not applicable in the same way in the context of 
professional organizations (such as law firms, auditing firms, or universities).  Finally, the 
arguments of the paper were based on a conceptualization of professionalism developed in the 
Anglo-American context.  The arguments might not apply in the same way in other institutional 
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Professional employees Managerial employees 
Technical 
feasibility 
Greater space of feasible HRM practices: 
 Sourcing strategies focused either 
predominantly on “buying” human capital, 
“making” human capital, or a combination 
of both 
 Employee coordination strategies 
revolving predominantly around output 
and clan control (including organizational- 
and/or occupational-level “clans”) 
Smaller space of feasible HRM practices: 
 Sourcing strategies focused 
predominantly on “making” human 
capital 
 Employee coordination strategies 
revolving predominantly around 
behavior and clan control 
(organizational-level “clans” only) 
Institutionalism  Stronger institutions: 
 Qualification and development practices 
(as well as associated knowledge, skills, 
and behaviors) governed by professional 
institutions 
 Selection, assessment, and reward 
decisions made within networks of 
professional employees (importance of 
professional credentialing)  
 Individual task autonomy in flat 
hierarchies (informal coordination through 
“clans”) 
 High mobility across organizations, 
limited vertical mobility 
 Nesting of professional clan within 
organizational-level bureaucracy/clan of 
heteronomous professional organizations  
Weaker institutions: 
 Scope to adopt a wider range of HRM 
practices associated with career HRM 
system (internal job ladders, seniority-
based progression, narrow job 
definitions) and with high-involvement 
HR system (team-based work 
organization, broad job definitions, 
selective hiring, extensive training and 
development, incentives linked to 
team/organizational performance)  
 
Psychology Social exchange perceptions weaker: 
 Less value attached to firm-specific 
training, development, and career 
opportunities and employment security 
 Less perceived need to reciprocate 
Social exchange perceptions stronger: 
 More value attached to firm-specific 
training, development, and career 
opportunities and employment security 
 Greater perceived need to reciprocate 
Economics Smaller economic benefits of integration in 
firm-level hierarchy/clan 
 Free-riding and hold-up problems 
associated with internal human capital 
development 
 Lower returns on investments in job 
embeddedness due to effective 
professional labor markets and lower 
transaction costs 
 Longer term benefits of field-level 
institutionalization (standardization) of 
HRM practices in terms of reduced labor 
cost competition, higher human capital 
investments, and greater dedication to 
Greater economic benefits of integration in 
firm-level hierarchy/clan 
 Firm-specific human capital 
requirements necessitate internal 
development  
 Higher returns on investments in job 
embeddedness due to lower turnover 
and higher transaction costs 
 Longer-term benefits of honing of firm-
specific HRM systems that uniquely 
support the firm’s core competencies 
and strategic positioning 
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